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A SUMMARY CIVIL REMEDY FOR TRADE-NAME INFRINGEMENT: 
THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 
GEORGE J. AlEXANDER* 
At a time when most legal relief is slow in coming, expensive, and 
subject to many esoteric considerations, there must be something delight­
fully refreshing to a layman in an acceptable drumhead proceeding in 
which he can have his rights vindicated against a malcreant. In 1937, New 
York supplied just such relief against persons guilty of deceptive trade­
name infringement by passage of Section 964 of the Penal Law.l In the 
intervening two and a half decades, the courts of New York, in applying 
the statute's rather novel provisions, have shed a good deal of light on 
the nature of the sumary remedy. The following discussion is intended 
not only to summarize the judicial experience, but also to extrapolate from 
this experience some conclusions about the nature of any similar summary 
civil remedy. 
AN ADJEcnVE ANATOMY OF SECTION 964 
Before turning to the complicated substantive provisions of section 964, 
one must understand its procedural content. It is, after all, the adjective 
ramifications of the section that have introduced both the novelty and 
complexity which pervade the substantive part. The language of the 
statute is quite unpretentious. After providing an apparently atrophied 
criminal remedy, 2 it continues, "'Whenever there shall be an actual or 
threatened violation of this section, an application may be made to a court 
or justice having jurisdiction to issue an injunction, upon notice to the 
defendant of not less than five days, to enjoin and restrain said actual or 
threatened violation."3 The quoted language is as much guidance as the 
legislature thought necessary to enable the courts to establish the procedure 
for instituting an action under section 964. 
\Vhile the lower courts were attempting to reconcile the five-day-notice 
motion with extant provisions of the Civil Practice Act, .the Court of 
Appeals decided one of the few cases it has decided to date on the meaning 
• Assistant Professor of Law at Syracuse University College of Law. 
1 .  N.Y . Penal Law § 964 . 
2. No reported case of criminal application exists. 
3. N. Y .  Penal Law § 964. 
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of the section. In Julius Restaurant, Inc. v. Lombardi,4 the Court made 
short shrift of attempted accommodations saying: "The failure of the 
Legislature to enumerate the detailed procedures is but further indication 
of an intent to allow the courts sufficient scope to adopt the procedure 
necessary to accomplish prompt relief. There is nothing to prevent a court 
from making necessary rules save only as these may be inconsistent with 
acts of the Legislature . . . ."5 Having declared the right, they proceeded 
to exercise it. Consequently, it was decided that (1) a 964 motion can 
be determined without the institution of a plenary action against the 
defendant; (2) a notice of motion and verified petition are sufficient for 
bringing a 964 proceeding; (3) a petitioner need not give notice more 
than five days before the motion is to be heard. 
It follows that if there is a failure to submit reply affidavits within 
the requisite number of days prior to the hearings, petitioner is entitled 
to a judgment, assuming only that his petition is proper in form and 
alleges appropriate facts. Since a number of cases suggest that a sworn 
affidavit of lack of deceptive intent is insufficient to block a 964 motion,6 
respondent is apparently required within the five days allotted to fnd 
sufficient information to persuade the court of the lack of deceptive intent 
in whatever similarity exists between his name and the petitioner's. 
Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Practice,7 provides that the same rules 
which govern service of summons also apply to the service of the notice 
of motion and petition. The rule, apparently, governs 964 petitions.s 
It may be, that as far as the quoted provision of the statute is concerned, 
Julius Restaurant has accomplished the major required accommodation 
and that the normal rules of motion practice otherwise apply.9 
The statute provides that an injunction shall issue "if it shall appear 
to the satisfaction of the court or justice, that the defendant is in fact 
assuming, adopting or using such name, or is about to assume, adopt or 
use such name, and that the assumption, adoption or use of such name 
may deceive or mislead the public . . . ."10 Since the statute is part of 
the penal code, there was some question whether "satisfaction," within 
the meaning of this action, required proof rising to the criminal beyond­
a-reasonable-doubt standard. It seems reasonably well settled now, however, 
4. 282 N.Y. 126, 25 N.E.2d 874 (1940). 
5. Id. at lll0, llll, 25 N. E.2d at 876. 
6. Note 79 infra and accompanying text. 
7. "The provisions of the rules and statutes relating to the mode of personal service 
of a summons shall apply to the service of any process or other paper whereby a pro­
ceeding is begun in a court .. .. " 
8. International Underwear Corp. v. International Mills, Inc., 121 N.Y.S.2d 211 
(Sup. Ct. 1951l). 
9. A motion brought under § 964 is not an action on a contract and consequently 
may be instituted by a corporation not licensed to do business in New York. Dunkin' 
Donuts of America, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 8 App. Div. 2d 228, 188 N.Y.s.2d 1!12 
(lld Dep't 1959). 
10. N.Y. Penal Law § 964. 
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that undoubtable proof is not required.!l The appropriate characterization 
of the standard to be born by petitioner would seem to be that his evi­
dence must be "conclusive"l2 or that he is required to make a "clear 
showing."13 
Should the petitioner succeed on his motion, "an injunction may be 
issued by said court or justice, enjoining and restraining such actual or 
threatened violation . . . :'14 The injunction in question has uniformly 
been held to be a permanent injunction. Indeed, where petitioner's 964 
motion sought a temporary injunction a court concluded that the petition 
was not being brought for 964 relief because of the inappropriate prayer.l5 
An application for 964 relief does not prohibit a later action under 
state or federal trademark statute or under more general principles of 
unfair competition. Consequently, a denial of the petitioner's motion in 
the 964 proceeding does not bar an action in which the petitioner (now 
plaintiff) seeks again to enjoin the use of the respondent-defendant's right 
to use the name in question.l6 
Indeed, there is danger in attempting to combine 964 proceedings 
with plenary action. In Dictograph Products Co. v. Aurafone Corp.,11 the 
court stated that 964 relief cannot be given as an incident of a pending 
plenary action against the same parties for the same relief. 
OUTER LIMITS OF ApPLICATION 
In rather inclusive language, the statute prohibits the use of any 
(1) name, (2) designation, (3) style, (4) symbol or (5) address: in a corporate 
or commercial enterprise or as an assumed name, for advertising purposes 
or for the purposes of trade or for any other purpose, with intent to 
deceive or mislead.ls "Any other purpose," following the terms advertising 
II. Overseas News Agency Inc. v. Overseas Press, Inc., 185 Misc. 1010, 58 N.Y.S.2d 540 
(Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 270 App. Div. 745, 59 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep't 1945); Fainblatt v. Leo 
Sportswear Co., 178 Misc. 760, 36 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1942). Contra, Atlas Corp. v. 
Atlas Investing Corp., 98 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1950). 
12. Miss New Yorker Shops, Inc. v. Kasman, 139 N.y.s.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1955). 
13. Tornado Indus., Inc. v. Typhoon Indus., Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 43, 187 N.Y.S.2d 83 
(Sup. Ct. 1959). 
14. N.Y. Penal Law § 964. 
15. Philip H. Oswald, Inc. v. Oswald, 19 Misc. 2d 164, 194 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. 
1959). 
16. Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Restaurant, Inc., 186 F. SUpp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 
1960). 
17. 20 Mise. 2d 877, 195 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
18. No person, firm or corporation shall with intent to deceive or mislead the 
public, assume, adopt or use as, or as part of, a corporate, assumed or trade 
name, for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, or for any other 
purpose, any name, designation or style, or any symbol or simulation thereof, 
or any part of any name, designation or style, or any symbol or simulation 
thereof, which may deceive or mislead the public as to the identity of such person, 
firm or corporation with any other person, firm or corporation; nor shall any 
person, firm or corporation, with like intent, adopt or use as, or as part of, 
a corporate, firm or trade name, for advertising purposes, or for the purposes 
of trade, or for any other purpose, any address or designation of location in 
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purposes or purposes of trade in the statute, appears in the course of inter­
pretation, to have been significantly confined, presumably by the principle 
of an ejusdem generis, to commercial purposes. Only six reported cases 
have considered the application of section 964 to the misleading use of a 
name or designation in a non-commercial setting;1 9 in only one was plaintiff 
successful. In Matter of Pignatelli,20 the petitioner claimed the right to 
use the title Prince Pignatelli as a result of foreign ascension to that rank. 
It was his claim that the respondent's use of Princess Pignatelli was de­
ceptive, the user not having been officially enobled. In the opinion of the 
court, section 964 was an inappropriate vehicle for the testing of defendant's 
title. Equally short shrift was given in New York League of Locality 
Mayors, Inc. v. The LocaZit)! Mayors of New York, Inc., 2 1  to petitioner, a 
charitable organization, which claimed an exclusive right to use its name 
for its charitable work. When the Free Gift Baptist Church, Inc. brought 
action against its allegedly removed minister to enjoin his continued use 
of the church name, the court again held for the respondent. 2 2  It is not 
so clear in the last case, however, that respondent's success depended on 
a reading of commercial purposes as a necessary prerequisite to the appli­
cation of the statute. In the opinion, the court explained its ruling on 
grounds that the petition failed to eliminate "serious questions of fact 
with respect to the respondent's status in the petitioner-church and his 
attempt to deceive and mislead the public."2 3 
Political names have also been the subject of requested injunctions. 
The right to use the name Hungarian Freedom Fighters, Inc. was bitterly 
contested. 2 4  The court denied the motion. The right to use the name 
Trades Union Party was the subject of another action. 2 5  In the latter case 
the petition was denied expressly on the grounds that the statute was not 
designed to bring relief in political cases. In only one reported case have 
the courts given relief despite the non-commercial nature of the applicant.:!6 
the community which may deceive or mislead the public as to the true address 
and location of such person, firm or corporation. NY. Penal Law § 964. 
19. Hungarian Freedom Fighters Fed'n, Inc. v. Samson, 30 Misc. 2d 354, 219 
N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Free Gift Baptist Church, Inc. v. McCray, II Misc. 2d 865, 
172 N.Y.S.2d lOll (Sup. Ct. 1958); New York League of Locality Mayors, Inc. v. Locality 
Mayors of New York, Inc., 12 Misc. 2d 361, 173 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Wm. J. 
Sheldrick Ass'n, Inc. v. Robert E. Blaikie Regular Democratic Organization, Inc., 134 
N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Brennan v. Mahoney, 165 Misc. 276, 300 N.Y. Supp. 1295 
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 252 App. Div. 741, 299 N.Y. Supp. 750 (1st Dep't 1937); Matter of 
Pignatelli, 175 Misc. 139, 22 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
20. 175 Misc. 139, 22 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
21. 12 Misc. 2d 361, 173 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
22. Free Gift Baptist Church, Inc. v. McCray, II Misc. 2d 865, 172 N.Y.S.2d 1011 
(Sup. Ct. 1958). 
23. Id. at 866, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 1012. 
24. Hungarian Freedom Fighters Fed'n, Inc. v. Samson, 30 Misc. 2d 354, 219 N.Y.S.2d 
348 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
25. Brennan v. Mahoney, 165 Misc. 276, 300 N.Y. Supp. 1295 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 252 
App. Div. 741,299 N.Y. Supp. 750 (1st Dep't 1937). 
26. William J. Sheldrick Ass'n, Inc. v. Robert E. Blaikie Regular Democratic Organ-
HeinOnline -- 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 5 1962-1963
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The petitioner in that case proved successful in his attempt to prevent 
the use of the words "regular" and "democratic" by a candidate who had 
been defeated in the regular democratic primary. Facing the issue of the 
non-economic nature of the activities sought to be enjoined, the court held 
that section 964 applied as well where the reference ran to political as opposed 
to commercial identification. It would seem, both as a matter of statutory 
interpretation and the interpretation of the meager case authority, that 
only commercial deceit is included in the interdiction of section 964 and that, 
probably, the Sheldrick case27 is incorrect.28 It should be noted, however, 
that the commercial enterprise may be a non-profit organization.29 
Another problem peripheral to the application of section 964 relates to 
the applicability of the section to the use of a name for a commercial purpose 
that the petitioner is affiliated with, but not identical to, the respondent. 
The problem was recently dramatically presented in Application of 
National Sand b Gravel Association.30 In that case, petitioner's name 
was used on respondent's letterhead to indicate that respondent was 
"cooperating" with the petitioner. Both petitioner and respondent were 
trade associations having many common purposes and, indeed, "cooperating" 
in some sense. It appears, however, that use of petitioner's name was 
unauthorized. The court refused relief on the theory that respondent had 
not used petitioner's name as a trade name and consequently, the section 
was inapplicable. It is submitted that in light of the language of section 964 
relating to the use of a trade name for "advertising purposes," such a ruling 
is unsupportable. The result, however, would seem correct because of a 
later section of the act which qualifies the applicability of the afore­
mentioned section with: "which may deceive or mislead the public as to 
the identity of such person . . . with any other person . . . ."31 Since 
identity is neither claimed nor likely to result from reading of the letter­
head claiming "cooperation" it would seem that the requisite deception 
was improbable in the principal case. In fact, the use of respondent's name 
on the stationery together with the qualification that he was cooperating 
with petitioner, would seem to make it evident to even a casual reader 
that two associations existed and that their identities were separate. 
ization, Inc., 134 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1954). See the opinion of the state comptroller 
that a volunteer fire company could enjoin the use of a similar name by another 
company. The comptroller, however, qualified his opinion by stating that it might be 
necessary to bring the action under provisions other than § 964. 5 Ops. St. Comptr. 
476 (1949). 
27. Ibid. 
28. Of the enumerated purposes which bring violations within the act, only "other 
purposes" does not have a commercial qualifier. That term is, of course, limited by 
the application of the principle of ejusdem generis, to the reasons which are similar 
to those more specifically enumerated. See Bristor v. Smith, 158 N.Y. 157, 53 N.E. 42 
(1899). 
29. Association of Contracting Plumbers v. Plumbers Ass'n, 302 N.Y. 495, 99 N.E.2d 
542 (1951). 
30. 225 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Sup. Ct. 1962). 
31. N.Y. Penal Law § 964. 
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In a case similar with respect to the use of the name,32 the court ruled 
for the petitioner. In that case, the respondent had used the American 
Automobile Club's AAA insignia on his truck without authority from 
AAA. Petitioner, who had a right to use an encircled AAA sign on his 
truck, by virtue of contractual arrangement with the Automobile Club, 
sought an injunction against what he claimed to be deceptive use. In this 
case, as well as the one preceding it, the advertised name was not used as 
a trade name. It could indeed be argued that since the name of the truck 
owner was displayed on his vehicle as his trade name, there was, as in the 
previous case, no suggestion of identity with another party. In this case. 
however, it would seem within the purpose of the section to suggest that 
the identity intended is satisfied by a false claim of authorized association. 
The "identity" ran, arguably, to the entire group of authorized AAA service 
trucks. The major distinction between the cases lies in the result to the 
unauthorized use of the name. In the former case, there appears to be no 
attempt to solicit patronage on the basis of reliance on the petitioner"s 
backing. In the latter, the AAA symbol was, in all likelihood, the major 
point of identification of all service men in petitioner's situation. Con­
sequently, the use of the symbol was more likely to be identification than 
the name of the respondent and the resultant identification was, of course, 
deceptive. 
Another difficult problem arises when section 964 is invoked to enjoin 
the use of a trade name by a party who once had a right to that name. The 
problem is probably most difficult in those cases in which the name has 
become associated with the respondent rather than the petitioner at a time 
when the petitioner had the superior legal right to its use. One of the 
most illustrative cases is Chapron v. Bunkenburg.33 In that case, respondent 
procured climbing strawberry plants from the petitioner who claimed to 
have developed them. When the voluntary arrangement between the 
parties ceased, respondent continued to use the name Mt. Everest Climbing 
Strawberries which had become associated with the strawberries he pur­
chased. Respondent defended, when a 964 proceeding was brought. that 
since petitioner was a French corporation which had never sold at retail, 
the public identified the plants with respondent rather than with their 
French developer. Without grappling with difficult problems of statutory 
interpretation, the court found that the situation created a "question of 
fact" and, on that basis, ruled for respondent. In two other cases34 re­
spondent, who had previously had a right to a trade name, sold the name 
to petitioner with a convenant not to compete, and then resumed business 
32. Automobile Club of New York, Inc. v. Kamell. 19 Misc. 2d 57. 191 N.Y.S.2d 
649 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
33. 212 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
34. Schenne v. Benson, 178 Misc. 301. 33 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Agash 
Refining Corp. v. Gash, 182 Misc. 305. 50 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1943). 
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under a name approximating the prior name. The courts denied the 
application in both cases though the reasoning in each differed. In one case3;; 
the holding seems to depend primarily on the lack of proximity (and conse­
quently, lack. of confusion). In the other36 the court explained its conclu­
sion by stating that the remedy under section 964 was of necessity reserved for 
cases which were free from doubt. A similar problem arose in Fisher 
Spring Co. v. E. M. Fisher Spring CO.37 In that case two brothers who 
had operated under petitioner's name severed their business connection. 
Petitioner continued to operate the previously joint business while re­
spondent set up his own company still using the family name. Again the 
court ruled for respondent though it is not clear whether it did so because 
of respondent's asserted right to use his family name, because the customers 
of both petitioner and respondent were apparently well informed and 
consequently unlikely to be deceived, or for still other reasons. 
In Nagle v. Abrams3s petitioner urged respondent whose middle 
name, Nagle, was the same as petitioner's surname, to adopt Nagle as his 
trade name. 'When the two N agles ceased working together, the court 
granted petitioner's motion and enjoined the use of the name by respond­
ent. Again the rationale is somewhat obscured. Respondent had notified 
the trade that he was no longer associated with petitioner. Under the 
arrangement which had been suggested by petitioner, the trade knew 
respondent by the trade name Nagle without knowing the name was not 
his own. Nonetheless, the prior "Nagle" became, by judicial fiat, the only 
Nagle. 
Aside from the variance in rationale, above suggested, there is also 
some variation in result. In Darling Willis Avenues, Inc. v. Darling Disc. 
Market, Inc.,slI petitioner successfully enjoined the use of the word "Darling" 
on a line of items of juvenile furniture. Respondent who had purchased 
the stock. of a defunct company at auction continued to use the name 
which that company has acquired by franchise from the petitioner. 'Vhile 
it is not clear how petitioner had conditioned the right to use his name 
(a right for which it received $25 a week) it seems the agreement did not 
require the purchase of any product from respondent and could appro­
priately be used on any merchandise that the prior store chose to sell. 
The respondent, not a party to the contract, did not continue the $25 
weekly payments but did continue the use of the name until enjoined by 
the court. It is again not clear from the opinion whether the court 
enforced petitioner's right to charge for the use of its name or whether 
there is some other basis for the decision. 
35. Schenne v. Benson, supra note 34. 
36. Agash Refining Corp. v. Gash, supra note 34. 
37. 3 App. Div. 2d 475, 162 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1st Dep't 1957). 
38. 133 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
39. 192 N.y.s.2d 527 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
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After wading through the vagaries of rationale and result in the above 
cases, it is refreshing to read American White Cross Laboratories v. 
Gotham Aseptic Laboratories co . .w The court there held section 964 inappli­
cable where the challenged name was enjoinable only after a resolution of 
contractual provisions between the parties, suggesting that if the action were 
in the nature of breach of an agreement, the appropriate remedy would 
be a suit on the contract rather than invocation of an anti-deception statute. 
Since the statute requires deception as to the identity of the respondent41 
and since a clear and convincing showing is required for an injunction to 
issue, it would seem that in most cases in which the name has been asso­
ciated with both respondent and petitioner, a 964 injunction should be 
denied. It is difficult to understand how persons dealing with a man 
who has always called himself Nagle will be misled as to his identity 
when he changes his employment. A person acquiring similar merchan­
dise at a Darling discount store would seem no more confused if $25 
payments were being made to another than if those payments were dis­
continued. One is even led to wonder whether under facts such as those 
in the Chapron Case,42 the American strawberry plant distributor might 
not enjoin the use of the name by the person claiming to be its rightful 
originator. In short, the right to use the name would seem rather irrele­
vant to the public association of identity. Consequently, unless petitioner 
could demonstrate by some unusual fact that respondent's name had been 
forgotten and petitioner was the only person with whom it was associated, 
the application should be denied. This discussion should not suggest, of 
course, that there cannot be a clear showing that, despite the fact that 
two parties were once authorized to use a common name, the name re­
mains associated with respondent. For example, in Fiat Societa per Asioni 
v. Vaughn43 the well-known automobile company using the Fiat name 
authorized respondent to use its name in the sale of parts. It well may 
be assumed the public was not led to believe that Fiat and the respondent 
had a greater identity than that of franchised dealer and manufacturer 
both because of the recognition of the name and the established custom 
in auto parts supply. Consequently, when the relationship terminated, the 
court had little difficulty in enjoining the continued use of the Fiat trade­
mark, by the then disfranchised respondent. It seems unlikely, however, 
that many cases will arise in which the public can be assumed to have found 
so little identification between the respondent and the name which he had 
been using for trade purposes. 
It should, finally, be noted that the statute only interdicts deceiving 
40. 81 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1948). 
41. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. 
42. Chapron v. Bonkenberg, 212 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
43. 7 Misc. 2d 4, 166 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct. 1957), mod. on other grounds, 5 App. 
Div. 2d 821, 170 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1st Dep't 1958). 
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consumers as to the identity of persons. Consequently, a deceptive sim­
ilarity in book titles, for example, is not within the act. 44 
PETITIONER'S PROOF IN SECTION 964 PROCEEDINGS 
One of the first considerations, in evaluating the proof which must 
be presented by the petitioner, is the extent to which he is obligated to 
demonstrate public identification of his name as a prerequisite to enjoin­
ing respondent'S use of it. 'While such identification is, unquestionably, 
a consideration in many cases in which the issue is not discussed in the 
opinion, none of the reported cases even suggest a necessity for proof of 
identification unless the name in question is descriptive of someone or 
something other than the respondent. This solicitude for the petitioners 
can be traced to the principles of trademark law which allow a senior 
user of a trademark of certain sorts to enjoin a junior user without proof 
of identification of the mark with the senior user. 45 However appealing 
such a correspondence between the principles of law may seem, it should 
be noted that the trademark law serves a function differing somewhat 
from the function of section 964. In part, at least, trademark law is designed 
to protect a property right in the mark. It is not as clear that the anti­
deception language of section 964 will equally support a property right. 
At any rate the problem is more dramatically presented when the 
name in question is descriptive of the product of service that it identi­
fies. Under trademark law before a user may exclusively appropriate a 
descriptive name he must establish secondary meaning,46 since the law 
seeks to prevent awarding the first user the competitive advantage of 
appropriating the common name of the product for his exclusive use. 
It is, regrettably, not clear that secondary meaning must be established 
in a 964 proceeding. Indeed the cases on this question are in consider­
able disagreement. There are, of course, those which in a straightforward 
manner suggest that the junior use of a common descriptive name is en­
joinable only on proof of secondary meaning.47 The same reasoning is 
fairly implicit in other cases, though secondary meaning is not mentioned.48 
In other cases the courts have apparently been willing to enjoin the use 
of a descriptive name when respondent has used that name to palm off 
his product as that of the petitioner.49 'While for trademark purposes there 
44. Litwin v. Maddux, 7 Mise. 2d 750, 164 N.Y .s.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. 1957). 
45. Kathreincr's Malzkaffee Fabriken Mit Beschraenkter Haftung v. Pastor Kneipp 
Medicine Co., 82 Fed. 321 (7th Cir. 1897). 
46. See Keller Prods. v. Rubber Lining Corp., 213 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1954). 
47. Precision Apparatus Co. v. Precision Meters Co., 5 Misc. 2d 817, 165 N.Y.S.2d 
8!13 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (user of Precision Apparatus Co. enjoined user of Precision Meters 
Co.); Seltzer v. Flanaghan, 99 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (Roller Derby); Bill's Gay 
Nineties v. Fisher, 180 Misc. 721, 41 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (Gay Nineties). 
48. E.g., Hebrew Nat'l Kosher Sausage Co. v. Hebrew Kosher Co., 143 N.Y.S.2d 306 
(Sup. Ct. 1955) (both parties used the names which entitled the action). 
49. E.g., Old Forge Recreation, Inc. v. Enchanted Kingdom, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 150, 
168 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (Enchanted Forest v. Enchanted Kingdom). 
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is a vast difference between enjoining the use of a descriptive name which 
has acquired secondary meaning and preventing palming off by means of 
an injunction against the use of the name, no reason suggests itself why 
a similar distinction should lie in section 964 cases. Since section 964 requires 
that the petitioner prove respondent's deceptive intention in all cases,50 the 
missing element in unfair competition cases seems necessarily supplied. 
Of course, the precise nature of the deception may differ in section 964 cases, 
thereby perhaps altering the desirable outcome of the case. In Consumer 
Profit Sharing Co. v. Original Green Stamp CO.,51 the respondent was 
awarded judgment in petitioner's 964 action which sought to enjoin 
respondent's use of the words "Original Green Stamp" in soliciting peti­
tioner's trading stamp customers. The court ruled that the absence of 
proof of palming off was sufficient to defeat the application. Since, how­
ever, the respondent was the junior user of the Green Stamp name and 
the word "Original," taken literally, was deceptive, it may be argued 
that respondent was not assuming the deceptive identity of the first pur­
veyor of green stamps within the meaning of the act. 
Other courts enjoin the use of a descriptive name by a junior user 
irrespective of the lack of secondary meaning acquired.ri2 In still other 
cases, such a rationale is reasonably implicit.53 The Court of Appeals has 
had several chances to establish or deny a secondary meaning requirement 
but has apparently not chosen to adopt either course with sufficient clarity 
to convince the lower courts. In Playland Holding Corp. v. Playland 
Center, Inc.54 the court appeared to rely on secondary meaning to defeat 
the respondent's claim that the name "Playland" was descriptive and not 
subject to exclusive appropriation. In Lykens Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Elder 
Hosiery Mills, Inc.,55 however, the court summarily reinstated a trial court 
injunction which had been dissolved by the appellate division on the 
grounds that petitioner had not clearly established secondary meaning 
for the use of the words "thermal" or "thermol" on socks.56 In the Court 
of Appeals decision, there is no discussion of the secondary meaning argu­
ment, the Court finding it sufficient to decide that a clear showing had 
been made by petitioner in the trial court. In light of the explicit lan­
guage of the appellate division's opinion, the cryptic reinstatement of the 
injunction does little to settle the diverse opinions of the lower courts. 
50. " • • .  with intent to deceive or mislead the public . • . •  " N.Y. Penal Law 
§ 964. 
51. 30 Misc. 2d 354, 210 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. 1960). 
52. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 8 App. Div. 2d 
228, 188 N.Y.S.2d 132 (3d Dep't 1959). 
53. Industrial Plants Corp. v. Industrial Liquidating Co., 286 App. Div. 568, 146 
N.Y.S.2d 2 (1st Dep't 1955). 
54. 1 N.Y.2d 300, 135 N.E.2d 202 (1957). 
55. 9 N.Y.2d 1002, 176 N.E.2d 518 (1961). 
56. Ibid. Lykens Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Elder Hosiery Mills, Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 
664, 201 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1st Dep't 1960). 
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At least one court has arrived at a requirement which approximates 
secondary meaning. In Tornado Industries, Inc. v. Typhoon Industries,57 
the court denied an injunction against the use of the name "typhoon fence" 
by the user of "tornado fence." Reasoning that if the relief were granted, 
similar relief should be made available to the Cyclone and Hurricane 
companies which also make fences, the court characterized the application 
as having been made with unclean hands. It is, of course, not clear 
whether the analysis of the Tornado case would be applicable to a case 
in which there was an absence of use by others with a greater right to 
the name. 
There appears to be only one square holding that secondary mean­
ing must be established in any kind of a case; even in that decision the 
holding is one of three reasons given for denying the application. In 
H)'Zan Homes v. H),lan Terrace,58 the court refused to enjoin the use of 
the Hylan name. The opinion does not state the occupation of the par­
ties or how the name was being used, though the title of the case strongly 
suggests that home construction was at issue. If Hylan had geographic 
significance other than the identification of the petitioner's property, the 
court seems to have appropriately preserved a geographic name from ex­
clusive appropriation by one inhabitant. 
W·ith basic uncertainty pervading the entire secondary-meaning issue. 
it is not surprising that subtler points are obscured. In two cases, the 
name in question was apparently being used in a non-denominative sense. 
In 3 Hour Laundry & Dry Cleaning Stores, Inc. v. Swan Cleaners Syracuse 
Corp.59 the court denied an injunction against the use of a sign reading 
"3 Hour Shirt Laundry" which was in the window with the "Swan" sign 
which the respondent apparently regarded as his trade name. In Barnes 
v. Fuchs60 another petitioner was defeated in his attempt to have a com­
petitor directed to remove a sign reading "Colonial Furniture" in a store 
located near his "Colonial Furniture Shop." The latter respondent also 
used his trade name in large letters in juxtaposition to the words chal­
lenged.61 The courts, in both cases, indicated that the descriptive use was 
not within the language of section 964, and that a question of fact was raised 
by the denial of intent to deceive. It would seem that, as in the National 
Sand & Gravel case,62 a good argument could be made that deception as 
to identity was improbable. 
57. 20 Misc. 2d 43, 187 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
58. II App. Div. 2d 1047,206 N.Y.S.2d 475 (2d Dep't 1960). 
59. 25 Misc. 2d 597, 206 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1960). 
60. 7 Misc. 2d 456, 164 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1957). 
61. Cf. Speedry Chemical Products, Inc. v. Aurora Plastics Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 106, 
200 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1960) (the use of Speed-Dry by respondent for toys and paint 
could not be enjoined by petitioner who used Speedry for similar products since defendant 
negated deception by prominently placing his own corporate name on his label). 
62. Application of National Sand & Gravel Ass'n, N.Y.S.2d 44 (Sup. Ct. 1962). 
See note 30 supra and accompanying text. 
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"\Vhatever the policy with respect to non-descriptive names, there ap­
pears to be good reason to require proof of secondary meaning in the 
descriptive name cases. In the first place, there is probably no good 
reason for allowing the appropriation of a common name such as, for 
example, "Pizzeria" by one establishment. At very least, such protection 
should not begin until the name has risen to an identification of the 
respondent rather than the food he serves. The first reason suggests the 
second. Until the name is more likely to identify the owner than the 
product, there cannot be a clear showing of deception, as required by the 
statute. 63 Finally, until the identification of the name runs to the peti­
tioner, even if the public is deceived, it is not deceived as to the identity 
of the petitioner.64 Indeed, it seems that the Court of Appeals, even if 
it has not been definitive on the issue, leans strongly in the direction of 
the suggested requirement. 6o To say that petitioner must establish sec­
ondary meaning does not, of course, suggest the quantum of proof re­
quired. 66 
A closely related issue is the necessity of respondent's competition 
with petitioner. It is the usual trademark principle that the owner of a 
trademark may only enjoin its use in the hands of a person who com­
petes both geographically and in product with the plaintiff. 61 Under New 
York trademark law, however, the dilution of a trademark is a sufficient 
ground for injunctive relief. 68 Consequently, it is perfectly proper in this 
state, in an appropriate trademark action, to enjoin the use of a similar 
name although plaintiff's product and defendant's would in all likelihood 
not cause extensive customer confusion.69 The cases under section 964 seem 
to adopt the no-competition-required viewpoint of the dilution theory. 
In Albro lHetal Products Corp. v. Alper,70 the court granted an injunc­
tion to petitioner despite the lack of competition between him and the 
respondent.l1 Two courts, however, seem to have denied the view that 
63. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. 
64. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. 
65. See note 53 supra and accompanying text. 
66. It is regrettably also rather unclear from the reported decisions how courts 
which find secondary meaning an important part in petitioner's proof satisfy themselves 
of that issue in a § 964 proceeding. The only case which appears to have directly con­
sidered that precise question is Industrial Lithograph Co. v. Miller, 203 Misc. 299, 117 
N. Y.S 2d 50 7 (Sup. Ct. 1952). In Industrial Lithograph, the court refused to grant an 
injunction in part because the single affidavit filed by petitioner in which he asserted 
the name in question to have become widely associated with him was held insufficient 
proof of that issue. 
6 7, See generally 3 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trademarks, §§ 76.3, 82.2(a). 
82.2(c) (2d ed. 1950). 
68. Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N. Y. Supp. 176 
(Sup. Ct. 193 7). 
69. Ibid. 
70. 281 App. Div. 68, 11 7 N. Y.S.2d 342 (1st Dep't 1952). 
71. "Although the parties may not be in competition . . . it is still sufficiently 
clear upon the facts that confusion is likely and that plaintiff is entitled to the pro­
tection of its name against the incursion of defendants." Id. at 69, II 7 N. Y.S.2d at 
343. See also Masters, Inc. v. Feldschuh, 15 Misc. 2d 992, 182 N. Y.S.2d 140 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
HeinOnline -- 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 13 1962-1963
SUMMARY CIVIL REiHEDY 13 
competItIOn between petitioner and respondent is irrelevant. In Indus­
trial Lithographic Co. v. Miller72 the court denied relief to the petitioner 
in part because petitioner had apparently not known of respondent's use 
of the name for a number of years, the court concluding from this fact 
that petitioner suffered no significant harm. In Hylan Homes, Inc. v. 
Hylan Terrace, Inc.73 the court also ruled for respondent in part because 
respondent and petitioner were not in competition. 
On this point, as on many others, the statute is not entirely clear. 
Certainly, the competitive posture of the parties bears some relationship 
to the likelihood of deception as to the identity of the respondent.74 On 
the other hand, the fact that both "actual" and "threatened" violations 
are covered, the fact that no proof of actual deception is required75 and 
the fact that, arguably, any person may bring the action without himself 
being aggrieved by the alleged deception76 appear to militate toward the 
opposite conclusion. 
If there is truly an intention by the court to restrict the application 
of the statute because of its drastic sanction, a purpose often avowed in 
the opinions,71 it would seem that requiring (a) that the party be aggrieved 
and (b) that there be a threatened competitive loss by the use of the name, 
would help select the cases most appropriate for summary injunctive relie£. 
Once petitioner has established the right to enjoin the use of his name 
by another, the statute would presumably require additional proof of 
intent to "deceive" or "mislead" the public. The cases, however, suggest 
rather strongly that the intention to deceive is implicit in the use of the 
name. An early case78 appears to have cleared the path for the later 
decision by holding that, whatever the word "intent" in section 964 meant, at 
least insofar as it relates to the civil injunction, it did not mean criminal 
intent. Later cases seem to have resolved the problem largely by appli­
cation of a deceptive inference from the use of the name.79 Court after 
court has echoed the conclusion that "no honest reason can be sugges-
72. 203 Misc. 299, 117 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sup. Ct. 1952). 
73. 11 App. Div. 2d 1047, 206 N.Y.S.2d 475 {2d Dep't 1960). 
H. See note 30 supra and accompanying te...t. 
75. Petitioner is expressly absolved from proving that "any person has in fact been 
deceived or misled:' N.Y. Penal Law § 964. 
76. "Whenever there shall be an actual or threatened violation of this section, 
an application may be made to the court or justice having jurisdiction to issue an 
injunction, . • .  :' N.Y. Penal Law § 964. . 
77. The Court of Appeals has subscribed to this view in strong language. "The 
very nature of the remedy-a permanent injunction-to be had without a trial on 
affidavits alone-requires that it be invoked only when the right thereto is established 
in a clear and convincing manner. Where basic factual allegations of violation are 
controverted summary relief may be denied." Association of Contracting Plumbers of 
City of New York, Inc. v. Contracting Plumbers Ass'n of Brooklyn and Queens, Inc., 
302 N.Y. 495, 498, 99 N.E.2d 542, 544 (1951). 
78. Fainblatt v. Leo Sportswear Co., 178 Misc. 760, 36 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1942). 
79. Hebrew Nat'l Kosher Sausage Co. v. Hebrew Kosher Co., 143 N.Y.S.2d 306 
(Sup. Ct. 1955) and cases therein cited. 
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ted . . .  " which would have impeUed respondent to use petitioner's name. so 
It is rather evident that at this stage in the proceedings, the courts expect 
respondent to come forward with some acceptable explanation negating 
the deceptive inference.s1 Indeed, courts have gone so far as to hold that 
even absent knowledge on respondent's part of petitioner's use of the same 
name, an injunction would be appropriate. 82 Petitioner's case is, of course, 
strengthened when the reason for respondent's use of the name is weak. S3 
Equally helpful to petitioner is any fact which would tend to establish 
knowledge on the part of the respondent of petitioner's prior use. 84 Fi­
nally, it should be noted that some decisions which appear to depend 
on a finding of lack of intent, are probably more explicable in other 
terms.S5 
Since the courts apparently have authority to make appropriate pro­
cedural rules to accomplish the purpose of section 96486 the rule which re­
quires that respondent come forward with an affidavit showing whatever 
nondeceptive purpose he may have had in adopting the name once the 
plaintiff had made an appropriate showing appears to be quite practicable. 
The respondent's reasons for the use of his name appear capable of his 
proof with considerably greater ease than if the burden were shifted to 
the petitioner. On the other hand, it must be remembered that respondent 
has merely five days after receipt of the notice of motion in which to file 
his responsive affidavits. It may well be that a businessman who does not 
retain a full-time attorney may be at a disadvantage, even in the presen­
tation of the simplest facts. The petitioner, after all, can choose his own 
time. Be that as it may, it seems difficult to explain the cases which go 
beyond requiring defendant to come fonvard with a showing of non de­
ceptive intent and essentially read intention out of the statute. How, as 
a matter of statutory interpretation, a court can enjoin a defendant, ad­
mitting arguendo that he may have had no knowledge of another's use 
80. Ibid. Atlas Corp. v. Atlas Investing Corp., 98 N.Y. S. 2d 60 ( Sup. Ct. 1950). 
81. Scher and Feldman, Inc. v. Jubilee Juniors, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 3 25, 19 2 N.Y. S.2d 
5 24 ( Sup. Ct. 1957). ( "The respondent has failed to offer any acceptable explanation;" 
petitioner was successful. Id. at 3 26, 19 2 N.Y. S. 2d at 5 26). 
8 2. "We might even accept defendants' statement that they did not know of plain. 
tiff's name and business at the time they adopted the name . . .. "; judgment nonethe· 
less for petitioner. Albro Metal Products Corp. v. Alper, 281 App. Div. 68, 69, I Ii 
N.Y. S. 2d 342, 343 (1st Dep't 195 2). 
8 3. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Lilco Mfg. Co., 3 Misc. 2d 7 78, 15 2 N.Y. S. 2d i40 
( Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 766, 161 N.Y. S. 2d 579 ( 2d Dep't 1957), in which 
the court said, "The clearest cases . . .  arise when the name assumed by a second user 
is not a word in the English language, but a contrived or coined word or, if a word in 
the common vocabulary, one not merely descriptive of the business but patently a trade 
name. " Id. at 780, 15 2 N.Y. S. 2d at 742. 
84. Equity Investment Corp. v. Wilkinson, 188 N.Y. S. 2d 10 21 ( Sup. Ct. 1959) 
(respondent had once received a commission for work done for petitioner; judgment 
for respondent). 
85. Heimowitz v. Steri·Clean Diaper Co., 11 Misc. 2d 919, 168 N.Y. S. 2d 38 ( Sup. Ct. 
1957) (court denied relief to petitioner asserting doubt as to deceptive intent, but 
petitioner was seeking to appropriate descriptive name). 
86. Julius Restaurant, Inc. v. Lombardi, 28 2 N.Y. 1 26, 25 N. E. 2d 8 74 (1940). 
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of the same name, in face of a statutory provision reqmrmg "intent to 
deceive or mislead the public" is difficult to understand. Even harder to 
understand is the policy reason for such a decision. If one can justify 
the drastic summary proceedings authorized under section 964, it must be 
done on some basis which connects the relief with a clear misdeed of the re­
spondent. "Why an equal remedy ought to be afforded against a person 
who may have innocently trespassed on a property right, is not apparent. 
It should, of course, be noted that the Court of Appeals has not sanctioned 
the aforementioned interpretation. In fact, in rather strong language, that 
court seems to have rejected such an approach to section 964 proceedings.87 
Where the equities are strongly weighted for the petitioner, the court can 
protect him, without misapplying section 964, by granting a temporary 
injunction and setting the case for speedy tria1.8s 
DE'IERMINATIVE FACTORS 
As has been previously mentioned, when petitioner has brought him­
self within the application of the general provisions of section 964, defendant 
must come forward with evidence justifying his action. A denial in a sworn 
affidavit is apparently insufficient to constitute a defense.S!) It is not very 
much more helpful for the defendant to offer as a defense an improbable 
theory explaining the use of his name. So when respondent used his last 
name Alper as the basis of creating the Albro Steele Co. when an Albro 
Metal \Vorks Co. was previously extant, an injunction issued.9o \'\Then die 
president of a company claimed that he had taken his wife's first name, 
Lillian, plus the word company and created the Lilco Manufacturing Co., 
which just happened to match the abbreviation of the Long Island Light­
ing Co. he was also enjoined.91 An injunction issued against Leo's Sports­
wear, in competition with Lee Sportswear, despite the claim that the name 
was the first name of respondent's principal salesman.92 "Where an auto 
seat cover manufacturer in competition with the Rayco Co., adopted the 
name Layco because he was abbreviating "laying covers," because he sold 
Lako tops and because his first name was Leo (he asserted all three de-
87. "The wrong is in the use with intent • . .  The summary relief authorized should 
be invoked only when there is conclusive evidence of intent 'to deceive and mislead 
the Public.''' Association of Contracting Plumbers of City of New York, Inc. v. Con­
tracting Plumbers Ass'n of Brooklyn and Queens, Inc .. , 302 N.Y. 495, 501, 502, 99 N .. E .. 2d 
542, 546 (1951). 
fl8. This was done in Dictograph Prods. Co. v. Brooklyn Auralfone Corp., 20 Misc. 
2d 8 77, 195 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
89. Darling Willis Aves., Inc. v. Darling Disc. Mart, Inc., 192 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Sup. 
Ct. 1959) (affidavit treated as mere denial). Industrial Plants Corp.. v. Industrial 
Liquidating Co., 286 App. Div. 568, 146 N. Y.s.2d 2 (1st Dep't 1955) (dictum). 
90. Albro Metal Products Corp. v. Alper, 281 App. Div. 68, 11 7 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1st 
Dep't 1952). 
91. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Lilco Mfg. Co., 3 Misc. 2d 7 78, 152 N. Y.S.2d 740 
(Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 766, 161 N.Y.S.2d 579 (2d Dep't 1957). 
92. Fainblatt v. Leo Sportswear Co., 1 78 Misc. 760, 36 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1942). 
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fenses), he also lost his rights to continued use of the name.93 When Queen 
slacks were demoted to Duchess slacks in the same block in which Duchess 
Royal slacks were sold, without apparent reason, an injunction issued.94 
Similarly, when the HaCha Inn put Ande's Pizzeria-Nicks on its canopy 
in the same block as Andy's Pizzeria, an injunction issued.9:> Of course, 
where there is absolutely no explanation for the adoption of what appears 
to be a surname, an injunction will issue.96 For that matter, use of one's 
own surname is also not, by itself, a complete defense. Although under 
trademark law a person's surname is normally given exceptional protec­
tion against another's appropriation,97 such does not seem to be the case 
under section 964.98 Even a surname which has been long used in respondent's 
business can apparently violate section 964 where, for example, it is suddenly 
given new prominence in newspaper advertisements and on delivery 
trucks.99 
The geographic proximity of respondent to petitioner appears to be 
another significant consideration. Other things being equal, close loca­
tion can be relied on as a factor militating toward enjoining respondent's 
use of the name.IOO The required proximity cannot, of course, be stated 
entirely in geographic terms. For example, even within the dense environs 
of the New York City area, distances varying from 4 to 25 miles were 
held close enough to enjoin respondent's use of the name of a discount 
house,IOl while in the sparsely populated Adirondacks, the distance of 140 
93. Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Layco Auto Seat Cover Center, Inc., 205 Misc. 82 7, 130 N.Y.S.2d 
108 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
94. Hirsch v. Perlman, 51 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 268 App. Div. 1035, 
52 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1st Dep't 1945). 
95. Andy's Pizzeria Successors, Inc. v. Bellini, 11 Misc. 2d 799, 1 76 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. 
Ct. 1958). 
96. Kleinhans Co. v. Kleinhans Cleaners, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 10 7 7, 162 N.Y.S.2d 250 
(Sup. Ct. 1957). 
9 7. Horlick's Malted Milk Corp. v. Horlick, 143 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1944). 
98. The use of the respondent'S surname was enjoined in: Julius Restaurant, Inc. 
v. Lombardi, 282 N.Y. 126, 25 N. E.2d 8 74 (1940); Allen Carpet Cleaning & Rug Weaving 
Co. v. Martzolf, 29 Misc. 2d 205, 212 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Harvey Mach. Co. 
v. Harvey Aluminum Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 10 78, 1 75 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Astor v. 
Watson, 1 Misc. 2d 1026, 7I N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 2 72 App. Div. 1052, 75 
N.y.s.2d 291 (1st Dep't 1947). In Astor, respondent claimed to have the right to the 
use of the familial Astor name; the court, however, remained skeptical, at pages 333, 
334, it said: " He has never been known as 'Vincent Astor,' but states that he is a 
member of the Astor clan. His business experience and success cannot be compared 
to that of the petitioner. He has been in the main an employee of others." But see 
Fischer Spring Co. v. Fischer, 3 App. Div. 2d 475, 162 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1st Dep't 1957); 
Agash Refining Corp. v. Gash, 182 Misc. 309, 50 N.Y.S.2d 92 7 (Sup. Ct. 1943). 
99. Allen Carpet Cleaning & Rug Weaving Co. v. Martzolf, 29 Misc. 2d 205, 21 2 
N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
100. Julius Restaurant, Inc. v. Lombardi, 282 N.Y. 126, 25 N. E.2d 8 74 (1940); Equity 
Investing Corp. v. Wilkinson, 188 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (6 or 7 blocks); 
Composition Corp. v. Mac Composition Service, Inc., 13 Misc. 2d 764, 180 N.Y.S.2d 654 
(Sup. Ct. 1958) (across the street); Andy's Pizzeria Successors, Inc. v. Bellini, I I  Misc. 2d 
799, 1 76 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (in the same block); Hirsch v. Perlman, 51 N.Y.S.2d 
10 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 268 App. Div. 1035, 52 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1st Dep't 1945) (I block 
away). 
101. Bargain Town U.S.A., Inc. v. Bargain-Time Stores, Inc., 31 Misc. 2d 682, 223 
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miles was held not too far.lo2 A converse application of the rule appears 
to have been utilized in Delmonico Hotel Corp. v. Delmonico Delicatessen, 
Inc.1fJ3 in which it was suggested that a location almost vis·a.-vis the peti­
tioner was insulated by the heavy traffic on the street, and, consequently, 
sufficiently distant to avoid deception.104 No case, including the last one, 
appears to have exonerated a respondent solely on the basis of the lack. of 
his proximity to the petitioner. The cases which discuss proximity how­
ever,lfJ;j seem to suggest that 964 protection has its geographic limitation. 
It is submitted that such implicit reasoning is entirely consonant with the 
statute to the extent that the court may find it a proper inference that 
deception varies with distance. Indeed, when the geographic range is 
adjusted to accommodate the likely competitive arealOS the geographic 
limits rule seems an unchallengeable application of the deception standard. 
Still another variable in considering the likelihood of deception is 
the degree of sophistication to be e.xpected of the customers. In two cases, 
the fact that the buyers were known to be knowledgeable was at least par­
tially determinative in a ruling for the respondent. lor 
A question concerning deception on which there appears to be a split 
of authority is whether respondent may avoid unfavorable judgment by 
notifying his customers that he is  not the petitioner. In Nagle v.  Abrams,los 
the court found Nagle's letter disclaiming continued association with the 
petitioner insufficient to avoid the injunction. A similar result was reached 
in Application of National Sand & Gravel Association,lo9 despite the fact 
that a prompt retraction was issued. On the other hand, in Speedry 
Chemical Products, Inc. v. Aurora Plastics Corp.po the court allowed a 
:;imilar use of the name where respondent carefully placed his own name 
prominently on the otherwise similar bottles. 
Finally, defendant might allege, if the facts support the allegation, 
that there is such a disparity in size between his business and the respond­
ent's that customers could not possibly be confused. "Whether such a defense 
is still good is somewhat problematical. In Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc. 
N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 784, 224 N.Y.S.2d 408 (2d Dep't 
1962). Accord Playland Holding Corp. v. Play1and Center, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 300, 135 N. E.2d 
202, 152 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1956) (5 miles). 
102. Old Forge Recreation, Inc. v. Enchanted Kingdom, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 150, 168 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct. 1957). 
103. 27 Misc. 2d 37S, 210 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1960). 
104. See also Schenne v. Benson, 178 Misc. 301, 33 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. 1942) 
(petitioner not within competitive distance when established business outside the city 
of BulTalo, while petitioner located in Buffalo). 
105. See note 98 supra and accompanying text. 
106. See cases cited notes 99 8: 100 supra. 
107. Fischer Spring Co. v. Fischer, 3 App. Div. 2d 475, 162 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1st Dep't 
19:i7): Overseas News Agency, Inc. v. Overseas Press, Inc., 185 Misc. 1010, 58 N.Y.S.2d 
540 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 754, 59 N. Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep't 1946). 
lOS, 133 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
109. 225 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Sup. Ct. 1962). 
l lO. 23 Misc. 2d 106, 200 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Sup. Ct. 1960). 
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v. Cohenll1 respondent was allowed to continue the use of the name 
Alexander's Department Store because respondent's store was drastically 
smaller than petitioner's. In Playland Holding Corp. v. Playland Center, 
Inc.,l12 however, the respondent's "much smaller"113 amusement park 
unsuccessfully invoked the same defense. Furthermore, the users of the 
name Bargain-Time were enjoined by a discount house known as Bargain 
Town USA despite a disparity of size which appears rather closely to 
approximate the disparity in the Alexander case.l14 
A few courts will accept more exotic explanations for the use of a 
name. Where three members of the LaPlaya Sextet formed a LaPlata 
Sextet, they were able to convince the court of lack of deceptive intent by 
demonstrating that the words did not sound alike in Spanish and that they 
had different translations.115 In Barnes v. Fuchs116 the court gave serious 
consideration to respondent's claim that he was not responsible for the 
sign displaying the allegedly deceptive name because it had been erected 
for him by an independent contractor. In Industrial Lithographic Co. v. 
Millerll1 the court accepted respondent's assertion that he could not cause 
harm to the petitioner because he was merely a salesman as opposed to a 
retailer. 
Imaginative defenses are, however, not always rewarded in section 96·1 
cases. It is no defense that respondent had a legitimate competitive grudge 
against the petitioner.lls One may also not adopt a well-known symbol, for 
example the enclosed AA, to indicate to customers that one's service is simi­
lar to that offered by those displaying such symbol with authority.llo Indeed, 
such use may provide sufficient evidence of attempted palming off. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF SECTION 964 TO OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
DEALING WITH THE USE OF NAMES 
The application of section 964 is significantly affected by action to be 
taken in accordance with four other provisions, sections 9 and 40 of the Gen­
eral Corporation Law120 and sections 440 and 448 of the Penal LaW.121 Sec­
tion 9 of the General Corporation Law prohibits the Secretary of State from 
I l l .  295 N. Y. 55 7, 64 N. E.2d 2 74 (1945). 
II2. I N. Y.2d 300, 135 N. E.2d 202 (1956). 
l l3. Id. at 302, 135 N. E.2d at 204. 
114. Bargain Town U S.A., Inc. v. Bargain-Time Stores, Inc., 31 Misc. 2d 682, 22 3 
N. Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 784, 224 N. Y.S.2d 408 (2d Dep't 1962). 
l l5. Playa means beach; plata, silver. Alicea v. Sanchez, 10 Misc. 2d 196, 169 
N. Y.S.2d 202 (Sup. Ct. 1957). 
116. 7 Misc. 2d 456, 164 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1957). 
1I 7. 203 Misc. 299, II 7 N. Y.S.2d 50 7 (Sup. Ct. 1952). 
1I8. Snyder v. Kramer, 10 Misc. 2d 180, 168 N. Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 195 7). 
1I9. Automobile Club of New York, Inc. v. Kamell, 19 Misc. 2d 85 7, 191 N. Y.S.2d 
649 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
120. N. Y. Corp. Law §§ 9, 40. 
121. N. Y. Penal Law §§ 440, 440-a. 
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filing a certificate of incorporation of a domestic corporation, or recording a 
statement of designation of a foreign corporation seeking to obtain a 
certificate of authority to transact business in New York, if the name 
resembles a corporate name presently in use in the state or so nearly 
resembles it as to be "calculated to deceive." As a consequence of the 
application of this section, proposed corporate names are necessarily 
screened by the Secretary of State prior to their use and, therefore, prior 
to institution of a 964 proceeding against the company. In at least one case 
brought under section 964, the prior approval of the Secretary of State was 
instrumental in procuring judgment for the respondent.122 Section 40 
of General Corporation Law includes an equivalent provision for change 
of name. Since the Secretary of State has been authorized to make his 
determinations primarily on the impact of the name proposed without 
extensive consideration of collateral mitigating matters suggested by the 
applicant123 one would suppose an approved name to have been more 
vigorously tested than possible under section 964.124 
Section 440 of the Penal Law125 provides that any person doing busi­
ness under an assumed name shall file a certificate to that effect with the 
county clerk. 'Where priority of the use of the name becomes a significant 
issue in a 964 case, the filing date is, apparently, of some help; it has been 
instrumental in the denial of an application.126 
Section 440-a of the Penal Law127 requires that the assumed name be 
permanently and legibly displayed on a window or in another conspicuous 
place at the store. Violation of the section is a misdemeanor; it may also 
lead to a denial of 964 relief.128 Similarly, section 440-a makes it impossible 
for a court to accept a plea by respondent for a limited use of the peti­
tioner's assumed name or one similar to it.129 
122. Laundered Service, Inc. v. Laundered Linens, Inc., 136 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 
1954). Cf. Association of Contracting Plumbers of the City of New York, Inc. v. Con­
tracting Plumbers Assoc. of Brooklyn &: Queens Inc., 302 N.Y. 495, 99 N.E.2d 542 (1951) 
(certificate filed under Membership Corporation Law by Secretary of State held significant 
in denying an application under § 964). 
123. The Barber Co. v. Dep't of State of State of New York, 277 N.Y. 55, 12 N.E.2d 
790 (1938). 
124. Under § 301(a)(2) of the new Business Corporation Law, prior scrutiny may 
be considerably more stringent since the operative words of this new provision prohibit 
the use of a name "so similar to any • . .  name [presently used by a corporation] 
as to tend to confuse or deceive." The provision applies to both domestic and foreign 
corporations. Foreign corporations, however, have special dispensation to use a con­
flicting name that has been used by the foreign corporation for not less than ten years. 
N.Y. Bus. Corp. J,.aw § 302(b)(3). 
125. N.Y. Penal Law § 440. 
126. Westbury Medical Building, Inc. v. Symons, 23 Misc. 2d 1087, 204 N.Y.S.2d 
367 (Sup. Ct. 1960). 
127. N.Y. Penal Law § 440. 
128. Miss New Yorker Shops v. Kasman, 139 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1955)· contra 
Equity Investing Corp. v. Wilkinson, 188 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
" 
129. Consolidated Dairy Products Co. v. Maurino, 3 Misc. 2d 783, 151 N.Y.S.2d 799 
(Sup. Ct. 1956) (petitioner claimed to limit use to checks). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ApPLICATION OF THE SECTION 
It is impossible to restate the law evolved by the reported decisions 
of section 964 cases. They are, as the above discussion illustrates, contrary and 
confused. In addition, most are memorandum decisions which often list 
a series of considerations militating toward the result reached without 
explaining the actual basis of the ruling. Hardly any decisions have 
attempted an incisive analysis of the statutory language. The following 
restatement is, then, only in part a statement of what has happened; in 
part it is a blend of what seems, in retrospect, to have happened with only 
a foundation of more concrete conclusions. 
Procedurally, section 964 is generally consistent with New York motion 
practice. The section has its own provision, however, (five days) relating 
to length of notice required prior to the hearing. Also, it is not necessary 
under section 964 to institute plenary action against the respondent. Service 
of notice of motion is to be made in the same manner as appropriate for 
service of process. The only available remedy is a permanent injunction 
against the respondent. An action under the section, whether successful 
or not, does not bar a plenary action based on the same facts. 
Section 964 apparently has no application to non-commercial decep­
tion or to the vindication of property or contractual rights held by the 
petitioner unless those rights can be vindicated incidentally by an appli­
cation of the deceptive-identity standard. A petitioner may not enjoin 
the use of a descriptive name unless he can establish that the name has 
acquired a secondary meaning as his name. He can only prevent the use 
of his name by a person or company whose goods are sufficiently similar 
and whose location is not too distant to allow an inference of likelihood 
of consumer confusion. Once petitioner has made out a case for protection, 
and respondent's name is found sufficiently similar to allow an inference 
of confusion, the respondent is required to come forward with an ex­
planation. Even the use of respondent's surname is not sacrosanct. If the 
explanation is in any manner plausible, however, respondent is entitled 
to a plenary trial and the motion must be denied. Anything which proves 
the respondent's lack of intent to deceive is also sufficient to require that 
the motion be denied. This is true irrespective of whether customer con­
fusion is otherwise quite obvious. The respondent has three basic alter­
natives: He may (a) disprove the right of plaintiff to exclusively appro­
priate the name in question; (b) demonstrate a lack of confusion and 
deception under the present concurrent use (unless of course he denies use 
entirely) and (c) disprove his intention to deceive. Successful use of any 
one of these defenses suffices to defeat the motion. 
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SO;\IE CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING SUMMARY CIVIL REMEDIES 
Some of the described confusion in section 964 cases must b e  ascribed to 
the generality of the statutory language which left to the courts the prob­
lem of administration. The courts, also, must bear the brunt of some 
criticism for failure to evolve consistent principles of application in the 
twenty-five year period since the inception of the statute. Much of the 
criticism, however, seems properly leveled at the concept of a summary 
civil remedy for trade-name infringement. 
First, the legislative premise that a special summary proceeding is 
required in the trade-name area may be questioned. The pre-screening of 
corporate names by the Secretary of State would seem to eliminate some 
problems. The remedies of temporary and permanent injunctions, which 
are unaffected by the sumary remedy, allow relief to offended companies 
under the more traditional principles of trademark and unfair competition 
law. The precedence given to what may, in the final analysis, be merely 
an alternative form of relief would seem better applied to other areas of 
law where proceedings are delayed. 
It is, of course, possible that sumary relief is designed to provide a 
remedy to an aggrieved competitor without his reliance on expensive legal 
services. If this was a purpose of section 964, the cases suggest that the purpose 
was mocked. Indeed, it seems unlikely that a similar provision could be 
drafted which would eliminate the need for competent legal advice. So 
long as the proceeding aims at evaluating such intangibles as consumer 
deception, without trial, it will be necessary to rely on a practiced attorney 
capable of reducing such problems to acceptably brief affidavits. Unlike 
pleading under "liberal" rules, which can be tolerated on the theory that 
certainty will come at the trial, affidavits for summary proceedings must 
be quite precise. 
If, then, the petitioner will be required to retain an attorney, in any 
event, and if injunctive relief is generally available, there again seems 
reason to doubt that a special sumary remedy is required to prevent 
deceptive use of trade names. '<\That is worse, the availability of the remedy 
provides a tempting avenue of litigation. With nothing to lose (a ruling 
on the motion is not determinative of any later action) and everything to 
gain (the remedy is invariably a permanent injunction), there may be a 
natural inclination to try the 964 route as a part of any trade-name litigation. 
In fact, a remedy in the form of the present New York statute seems 
to provide more inducement to harass competitors than to bring relief. 
A company merely seeking to enjoin the use of a competing name with 
all possible dispatch would seem well advised to apply for a temporary 
restraining order, followed by a temporary and then permanent injunction; 
in this manner they could speedily and permanently remove the competi­
tive threat. The 964 relief, while quickly crystallized in the statutory five-
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day period, must await the ultimate decision of the court, since no tempo­
rary relief is authorized. For harassment, however, the five-day period is 
ideal and the delayed decision irrelevant. 
Finally, there may be something in the nature of a summary proceed­
ing quickly had, speedily formulated, and permanent in result, which 
reRects poorly on the concept of orderly justice. I t  also undoubtedly con­
tributes to the type of oversimplification which is perhaps best character­
ized by the rationale in Consolidated Dairy Products v. Maurino130 in 
which the court said "if the respondents did not and do not intend to 
deceive or mislead the public, it can do no harm to change the corporate 
name to another. On the other hand, if the respondents intend to use the 
name unfairly, they should be compelled to adopt a different name."131 
If a civil summary remedy is applicable, it would seem that every 
effort should be made at least to clarify the ground rules and to make 
them as equitable as possible. To begin with, five days from the service 
of a notice of motion to the time when respondent must have procured 
and filed affidavits of all the proof he intends to introduce is probably 
unnecessarily short. At any rate, it would seem that the harshness of such 
short notice could be mitigated by allowing respondent additional time, 
should he wish to contest the motion, subject to his assumption of what­
ever financial detriment petitioner may suffer by further delay. Another 
alternative would be to provide a temporary injunction, allowing respond­
ent some time to acquire information prior to issuance of a permanent 
injunction. Finally, the statute probably ought to be reduced, either by 
draftsmanship or interpretation to reasonably well defined rules. Petitioner 
should be required to show, as a condition to relief, that he has a right 
to e.xclusively appropriate the name to his own use and, if his name is 
descriptive, that the public has learned to associate it solely with petitioner. 
Furthermore, petitioner should have the burden of demonstrating that 
respondent's name infringes petitioner's use of the name diverting cus­
tomers who are confused into believing that an association exists between 
the parties. Upon a showing of the type above described, respondent should 
be required, if he contests the motion, to come forward with justification. 
Certain types of justification ought, as a matter of right, to entitle him to a 
favorable ruling. His own innocence in adopting the name would seem 
to remove him from the class of respondents whose right to use an assumed 
name ought to be summarily seized; such proof should be an absolute 
defense. He ought to be allowed to establish, by affidavit, that there is a 
factual controversy as to any of the conditions which petitioner was re­
quired to establish. The issue of the existence of a factual controversy 
could then be determined on the same basis as is commonly applied to 
130. 3 Mise: 2d 783, 151 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct. 1956). 
131. Id. at 784, 151 N. Y.S.2d at 800. 
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motions for summary judgment. Finally, he ought to be entitled to suc­
ceed by establishing that there is substantial consumer identification of 
the name as his name. The last defense is suggested to eliminate from sum­
mary proceedings cases brought to test covenants not to compete and 
other contractual rights which do not relate, directly, to consumer decep­
tion. It also serves to remove cases which are primarily brought to vindi­
cate alleged non-contractual property rights in trade-names. Finally, it 
supplies a defense in the nature of laches which requires an injured party 
to act at a time when the respondent can be presumed to b e  less dependent 
on the name he uses and which, as a result, minimizes the harassing po­
tential of a summary proceeding. 
